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Abstract
A distributed security architecture is proposed for
incorporation into group oriented distributed systems,
and in particular, into the Isis distributed program-
ming toolkit. The primary goal of the architecture is
to make common group oriented abstractions robust
in hostile settings, in order to facilitate the construc-
tion of high performance distributed applications that
can tolerate both component failures and malicious at-
tacks. These abstractions include process groups and
causal group multicast. Moreover, a delegation and
access control scheme is proposed for use in group
oriented systems. The focus of the paper is the se-
curity architecture; particular cryptosystems and key
exchange protocols are not emphasized.
1 Introduction
Systems that address security issues in distributed
environments have traditionally been constructed
upon the remote procedure call (RPC) paradigm of
communication (e.g., [4, 24, 28, 17]). Many systems,
however, utilize more general types of communication
which have not enjoyed the same amount of atten-
tion from the security community. One such alterna-
tive is group oriented communication, based on the
process group abstraction [I]. Process groups have
been incorporatedintomany distributedsystems (e.g.,
*Thiswork wu supportedby the DefenseAdvanced Re-
searchProjectsAgency (DoD) underDARPA/NASA subcon-
tractNAG2-593 administeredby the NASA Ames Research
Center,by grantsfrom GTE, IBM, and Siemerm,Inc.,and by
aNationalScienceFoundationGraduateFellowship.Any opin-
ions,conclusionsor recommendationsexpressedinthisdocu-
ment arethoseoftheAuthorsand do notneces_utrilyreflectthe
views,policiesordecisionsoftheNationalScienceFoundation
ortheDepartmentofDefense.
[18, 5, 2, 19, 23, 14, 13]) and have been shown to sim-
plify the implementation of fault tolerant applications
[5, 2, 14]. The benefit in preserving process group ab-
stractions in hostile environments could therefore be
great. In particular, it would facilitate the construc-
tion of applications that can tolerate both component
failures and malicious attacks.
To illustrate this need, consider a stock broker-
age that plans to establish a trading service to trade
stocks for a certain industry on the over-the-counter
market (OTC). The trading service will reside in a
large distributed system shared by other brokerages
and traders.Because the brokerage isa market maker
for that industry,other brokerages and traders buy
and sellstocksin that industry through that broker-
age,and so theservicewillbe utilizedby othertrader's
applications.The availabilityand performance of this
serviceiscrucial,and thus itmust be replicated.Ac-
cordingly,the firm'sprogrammers might liketo im-
plement thisserviceas a faulttolerantprocessgroup
usingtheirfavoritegroup orientedprogramming envi-
ronment.
At the same time, however, the brokerage iscon-
cerned about the securityofitsservice.The brokerage
plansto execute thisserviceon a potentiallydynamic
set of sites;e.g.,the brokerage may rent additional
machines during times of heavy load in order to rlJn
additionalservers. And, while the brokerage iscon-
fidentthat itcan protectthese sitesfrom corruption
while serversare executing on them, itcannot trust
that other sites,or the network by which the sit_
communicate, willbehave as expected. For instan,'o
corrupt tradersmay attempt to infiltratethe gro,_p
alteror forgegroup communication, or tamper Wlth
the group abstractionson which the consistencyan,l
correctnessoftheservicewould rely.So, ifthe ab_tra,-
tionsprovided by the group orientedprogramming ,_*_-
vironment are not robust againstmaliciousattack _T
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is doubtful whether it should be used at all. More-
over, the brokerage is not willing to entirely trust all
of its own brokers, and thus needs some way to enforce
security policies even within the set of protected sites.
Generalizing from this example, we are concerned
with facilitating the construction of high performance,
fault tolerant applications on a secured and potentially
dynamic "island" of sites. We approach this task by
making common group oriented abstractions robust
on this island, despite malicious attacks against them.
A second goal is to provide support for group oriented
security policies within such an island. Third, since
applications may need to interact with less trusted
parties outside of this island, we feel it is important to
provide guarantees regarding the results of such com-
munication.
Another impetus to preserve process group abstrac-
tions in hostile environments is that the cryptographic
community has identified several practical security
needs in settings where groups occur naturally [7].
Proposed solutions (e.g., [10, 15, 8]), however, presup-
pose a group oriented infrastructure which cannot be
effectively provided in a hostile environment by cur-
rent systems. Secure group oriented foundations will
enable applications to more easily realize the benefits
of this research.
This paper presents a distributed security archi-
tecture to be integrated with group oriented systems
and, in particular, with the Isis toolkit [2]. 1 Isis is a
toolkit for distributed programming that provides pro-
cess group and reliable group multicast abstractions.
With respect to Isis, the aims of this work are twofold.
The first is to weaken the execution model assumed by
Isis so that malicious behaviors are admitted, while
still preserving the abstractions provided by Isis. The
second is to enhance the Isis abstractions to be more
suitable for use in a hostile environment. And, of
course, we wish to accomplish these without unrea-
sonably degrading the performance of the toolkit.
The goal of this paper is to describe the ma-
jor features of our security architecture. More pre-
cisely, we discu_ how our architecture addresses three
needs, namely for group oriented authentication, se-
cure methods for joining groups, and causal multi-
cast protocols that are appropriate in hostile envi-
ronments. We also propose a delegation and access
control scheme for use in group oriented systems. We
do not discuss key exchange protocols or specific cryp-
tosystems in detail. We instead focus on the mecha-
1 This architecture is t_dlored to a reimplementation of the
IJis toolkit called Hortm, named alter the son of Isis in Egyptian
mythology. In this paper, we will use Hortm terminology, which
may be unfamiliar to users of earlier vevaions of Isis.
nisms we use to protect the abstractions that are fun-
damental in Isis and, we believe, in a group oriented
setting.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We
begin in section 2 with an informal description of the
abstractions provided by [sis. In section 3 we discuss
the system model for which Isis was designed and then
weaken this model to allow malicious behaviors. Sec-
tion 4 clarifies our goals and presents the three basic
aspects of our security architecture previously men-
tioned. Section 5 describes our group oriented delega-
tion and access control scheme. We end with a discus-
sion of the status of the system and future directions
of research.
2 The Isis abstractions
The basic abstraction provided by Isis is the process
group, which is simply a collection of processes with
an associated group address. Groups may overlap and
be nested arbitrarily, and processes may create and
join groups at any time. And, a process may be re-
moved from a group, either because it was perceived
to fail (i.e., crash) or because it requested to leave. A
group G can thus be seen as progressing through a se-
quence viewo(G), view1 (G),... of views satisfying the
following conditions.
* For all i, views(G) C_ P, where P is the set of all
processes in the system.
* viewo(G) = 0.
• For all i, viewi(G) and viewi+t(G) differ by the
addition or subtraction of exactly one process
Members of a group learn about the membership of
the group through certain events. More precisely, exe-
cution of a process p is modeled as a sequence e°, e_ ....
of events, each corresponding to the execution of an
indivisible action. One such event is the delivery of
the i-th group view viewi(G) of a process group G
Views are delivered to processes in sequential order.
with the constraint that the i-th view of G is deliv-
ered to p only if p E viewi(G). If the i-th group view
of G is delivered to p, then we say that p is in the i-th
group view until the (i + l)-th view is delivered or p
is removed from the group.
The primary means of communication in [sis _s
group mullicast. (Point-to-point communication L_
treated essentially as multicast in a static group .,f
size two, where any membership change destrov_ lh, _
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group.) A process in (some view of) a group can mul-
ticast to the group by specifying the group address as
the destination. Isis guarantees to processes certain
delivery properties regarding group multicasts. For in-
stance, all operational destinations eventually deliver
the message or, and only if the sender fails, none do.
And, all destination processes are in the same group
view when the message is delivered, and the set of
destination processes is precisely the members of that
view.
One guarantee of particular interest in this paper is
that messages are delivered in an order consistent with
potential causality. Informally, one message is said to
be causally before another if the former was sent before
and could have affected the latter [16]. Causal deliv-
ery ordering has been shown to be crucial in systems
such as Isis that exploit asynchronous operations to
achieve high performance [1], because when messages
are asynchronously pipelined to destinations, a mes-
sage could be received at the destination site before
another causally before it. The danger is that, e.g.,
an update to a data structure could be delivered to
an application before the message initializing the data
structure. A delivery ordering that respects causality
avoids such problems.
To define the causal delivery ordering in our set-
ting, we introduce two more types of events that can
be executed by a process p in a group G: the multi-
cast of a message m to G, denoted mcastp(m, G), and
the delivery of a message m multicast to G, denoted
deliverp(m, G). The potential causality relation --* is
defined as the transitive closure of the smallest rela-
tion _ satisfying the following conditions.
i
• For all i and p, ep -,-* e_+1.
• For all m, p, q, and G,
meastp(m, G) ",_ deliverq(m, G).
Isis' causal delivery ordering property guaran-
tees that if mcastp( m, G) -* mcastq(m°,Gt), then
at any common destination r, deliverr(m,G) --+
deliver_(m _, G°). In words, if the multicast of message
m causally precedes the multicast of message m I, then
m is delivered before m I at any common destination.
The multicast primitive that provides this property is
called CBCAST and is a fundamental building block
on which other Isis abstractions are implemented [3].
To summarize, Isis provides process group and
group multicast abstractions. Notification of group
membership changes are coordinated with respect to
the delivery of group multicasts. And, multicast de-
liveries to a process are ordered causally to allow Isis
to safely exploit asynchronous communication.
3 The system model
The basic system model for which Isis was origi-
nally implemented is very benign. Informally, that
system consists of a set of sites that execute the set
P of processes. (Unless otherwise stated, throughout
this paper the term "process" refers to an application
process, and the term "site" refers to a workstation
running an operating system and, once added, Isis.)
Sites and processes may fail, but only by crashing.
and if a site fails then so do the processes residing
upon it. The sites communicate via an asynchronous
network: no bounds on message transmission delays
are assumed.
The system model considered in this paper is ob-
tained by weakening aspects of this model in various
ways, namely by allowing the network or sites to be
corrupted by an intruder. The intruder can engage in
any active network attack (including denial of message
service) and can view all network traffic. However, we
assume that the intruder is limited in these attacks by
the (conjectured) properties of the cryptosystems and
signatures schemes we employ. We also assume that
the intruder does not engage in traffic analysis attacks:
i.e., we do not consider such attacks here and assume
that encryption is sufficient to hide the contents of a
message from a network intruder. The reader should
see [30] for a survey of network attacks.
We also assume that sites may be corrupted by an
intruder during system execution. Once corrupted, a
site may exhibit arbitrarily malicious behaviors, again
limited by the cryptosystems and signature schemes
we employ. For simplicity, we assume in this paper
that once a site is corrupted, it remains so forever
Intuitively, a corrupt site is one on which the operating
system or Isis code or data has been maliciously or
accidentally altered or replaced.
We make two assumptions about the operating sys-
tem running at an uncorrupt site. First, we assume
that it authenticates in a secure fashion the user iden-
tifiers of local processes. _ Second, we assume that it
provides protected, private address spaces for, and pri-
vate, authentic message passing between, all local sys-
tem and user processes. This includes the protecri_,t_
2This is a rather strong requirement, but the mechanism-
described in this paper facilitate its implementation. For exam-
pie, if smart-card technology is available, then each user and _t ,"
can be treated as an Isis group and the delegation mecham,t,_-
of section 5 can be used to authenticate the user identifier_ .
processes executed from remote sites in a fashion similar to th.,t
of DSSA [11]. Even without such technology, the auther_t, ,-
tion mechanisms of section 4.1 provide a secure communi,'at _ _
channel between any two sites that facilitates the authent i,-._t, _
of user identifiers.
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of virtual address spaces stored on external media.
In this paper we also assume that each uncorrupt
site maintains a local clock that is synchronized with
the clocks on all other uncorrupt sites. A clock syn-
chronization algorithm is currently being implemented
as part of a real-time extension of the Isis toolkit.
While a detailed discussion of this algorithm is out-
side the scope of this paper, we note that it is based
upon a time service which, with the authentication
mechanisms described in this paper and physical safe-
guards to ensure its integrity, can be adapted for use
in our system model.
Finally, we assume that the Isis failure detector and
name service behave according to specification (i.e.,
are not corrupt). These are services provided by Isis
and will be discussed briefly in sections 4.1 and 4.2,
respectively. The security of these services is a topic of
ongoing research; one possible approach is described
in [201.
4 Protecting the Isis abstractions
Informally, we would like to make the Isis abstrac-
tions described in section 2 robust in the system model
of section 3. In particular, we would like to ensure that
all processes in a group observe correct deliveries of
group views and messages. This is clearly impossible,
however, if a site hosting a group member is corrupt,
because that site could cause arbitrary events to be
observed in any order by any proce_ it hosts. We
are thus faced with two reasonable options: we can
either attempt to guarantee the Isis abstractions in all
groups, but to only those processes that reside on un-
corrupt sites, or we can attempt to guarantee the Isis
abstractions only in groups that have no members on
an uncorrupt site.
We have opted for the latter for several reasons.
First, the latter approach is more consistent with our
original motivation, namely to enable a programmer to
construct a fault tolerant application on trusted sites,
despite the fact that the network or other sites can-
not be trusted. Second, the former could be achieved
only through great cost to the performance of the sys-
tem; e.g., all correct sites would be required to reach
consensus on the contents of each group multicast be-
fore delivering it to the application. Such an overhead
would be unacceptable to the type of applications for
which Isis is intended. Third, very few of the Isis ap-
plications we have seen could tolerate the corruption
of some group members, even if the Isis abstractions
were provided to the correct members. And, we ex-
pect that very few developers would be willing to pay
the performance penalty of making their applications
tolerant of such corruptions.
A consequence of this design decision is that pro-
cesses residing on untrusted sites should not be al-
lowed to join a "trusted" group. In section 5. we
present a method by which access to groups can be
controlled. In those applications that require commu-
nication with processes on less trusted sites (e.g., the
trading service of section 1), we suggest that such com-
munication be performed in a point-to-point fashion
between the untrusted process and a single member of
the group. Then, for instance, the untrusted process
could multicast to the group by sending the message
to the member, which would multicast the message on
behalf of the process. This approach has the disadvan-
tage that a multicast from the untrusted site will be
somewhat slower. However, it is beneficial in that it
virtually eliminates any threat that the corrupt site
could pose to the consistency of the group members
(from the point of view of Isis); the one exception to
this is discussed in section 4.3.
Continuing, then, we restrict our efforts to process
groups that reside on uncorrupt sites. That is, let
sitesi(G) be the set of sites hosting the members of
viewi(G), and let an uncorrupt group G be one such
that at any time during execution, if site s is cor-
rupt and viewi(G) is the current group view, then
s _ sitesi(G). Then, in this work we enhance Isis
to ensure that if G is uncorrupt, then processes in
Ui viewi(G) observe correct sequences of events asso-
ciated with group G, and "external" operations that
involve G, such as group joins and communication
with sites outside of G, can be performed with cer-
tain security guarantees. Henceforth, when we speak
about a process group, we assume that it is uncorrupt,
unless otherwise stated.
As mentioned in section 1, in this paper we focus
on three issues that are fundamental to our goals. To
avoid an indepth discussion of how the Isis abstrac-
tions are presented to processes, we will not describe
how the mechanisms we present here are applied to
implement specific abstractions (e.g., the delivery of
group views). Instead, we concentrate on more basic
problems that could undermine these abstractions and
that must be addressed in any system offering similar
functionality.
First, a necessary step is to develop a subsystem
that provides efficient authentication of group muiIi-
casts. This subsystem should allow a site in a gro_J?
(i.e., a site hosting a member of a group) to detert r'tt-
tempts by an intruder to insert, alter or replay gr,-_,I,
messages or to impersonate another site in the gro_Jl,
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With such a subsystem, a site in the group could rely
upon the authenticity of messages apparently from
other sites in the group. In addition, since altered
messages would be detected (and ignored), attacks on
the integrity of messages would become indistinguish-
able from lengthy message delivery times, as are denial
of message service attacks already. And, since Isis is
constructed for an asynchronous network, Isis would
behave safely under such attacks. (Intuitively, here we
are reducing these active network attacks to commu-
nication failures.) In section 4.1 we propose such an
authentication subsystem.
Second, the protocol by which a process joins a
group is crucial to the process group abstraction, be-
cause the joining site's perception of the group mem-
bership is directly dependent upon the security of the
join protocol. In Isis, when a process requests to join
a group, it specifies the group address. This address
is used by the process' site to send the appropriate re-
quest to the group, and it is necessary that the process'
site be able to authenticate the apparent response of
the group. A related issue that must be addressed is
how a process can obtain an authentic group address
for a group it wishes to join. In section 4.2 we discuss
these issues and extend our architecture to address
them.
Third, in section 4.3 we discuss the task of pre-
serving causality among multicasts in a hostile envi-
ronment. We argue that simply preserving causality
among messages in one or several uncorrupt groups
may not suffice for groups that must communicate
with less trusted principals. We then formulate the
specific causal guarantees we provide, and describe
protocols to implement them.
4.1 Multicast authentication
We introduce authentication mechanisms at the
lowest layer of the Isis toolkit, namely the Multicast
Transport Service (MUTS) [29]. A copy of MUTS re-
sides on each site, logically at the transport layer of
the ISO OSI Reference Model, and provides to the lay-
ers above it at-most-once, sequenced multicast com-
munication to other sites. MUTS provides these ab-
stractions while insulating the higher layers from the
particular transport protocol used, which may exploit
hardware multicast capability.
For our purpomm, authentication must be intro-
duced at the MUTS layer. Since MUTS is the lowest
layer of the Isis toolkit, we cannot introduce authenti-
cation mechanisms closer to the network, and because
Isis is designed to run on many different platforms,
we cannot rely upon authentication mechanisms be-
ing available at lower layers. It would be fruitless to
authenticate messages only at higher layers of the Isis
system, as then they could not rely upon the abstrac-
tions provided by MUTS. For example, a network in-
truder could then undetectably tamper with the infor-
mation MUTS uses to sequence messages.
Before presenting our authentication mechanisms.
we briefly consider how MUTS works. Each MUTS
layer maintains a current member list of sites for each
group it (or rather, its site) is in. A copy of MUTS
learns about changes to the site membership of a group
from the layer above it, which communicates with
other sites in the group and with the Isis failure detec-
tor [2, 21] to make this determination. When MUTS
receives a message from a higher layer to be multi-
cast to a group, it opens a connection to the members
of its current member list for that group, if one does
not already exist. MUTS then breaks the message into
packets, and hands these packets to the transport pro-
tocol for transmission. A connection is associated with
exactly one group and is simply a logical end-to-end
data path from the originating site to the other sites in
the originator's member list. If a site is removed from
the originator's member list, it is also removed from
the connection, but if a site is added to the origina-
tor's member list, the old connection is disassembled
and a new connection is negotiated for the new mere+
ber list. Each packet carries with it the connection
number and a sequence number for the connection.
Connection numbers are unique system-wide, and the
sequence numbers for a connection form an increas-
ing sequence. When the sequence reaches its upper
bound, the connection is disassembled and a new oil,'
is negotiated.
Techniques for authenticating messages (or in this
case, packets) have existed in the literature for many
years. Traditionally, these methods have employed
encryption, but methods based upon pseudo.random
functions are also theoretically attractive. Inforrnattv
a pseudo-random function f has the property that t_
f is unknown, then it is computationally infeasible t_,
produce f(m) for any m with a probability of su,--
cess greater than random guessing, even after hav_u:
seen other {m', f(m')) pairs. Thus, given a famil_ ,,f
pseudo-random functions {fK}K_, indexed b.v k,.x-
from some key space IC, two parties that share _ ....
cret key K can authenticate messages between ,+:t,h
other by appending fK(m) to each message -+ i'-'+-':
(In Isis, we will efficiently approximate this techu_,£,_,
e.g., with one-way hash functions [27].)
For MUTS we generalize these ideas to take a,t_ ,+
tage of hardware muiticast capabilities that z_:t_
+35 +'+(.::?::_ QUAt.t++'Y
exploitedbythetransportprotocol.Instead of estab-
lishing a shared key for every pair of MUTS layers, we
establish a shared key per connection, called a connec-
tion key. The connection key is a secret held by the
sites involved in the connection and is used to authen-
ticate packets sent on the connection. When a connec-
tion is created, the site initiating the connection gen-
erates a new connection key K and distributes it, in a
fashion to be discussed below, to the sites on its mem-
ber list. Then, the multicast "m, fK(rn)" of packet m
on the connection can be verified at all destinations.
In addition, an application can request that its mes-
sage be encrypted, in which case any fragment of that
message included in packet m will also be encrypted
under K (e.g., using DES [6]). Provided that the con-
nection is fresh (i.e., established with a non-replayed
message), each destination can verify that rn is not a
replay, because it contains the sequence number for
the connection. Here we do not detail the protocol
by which a connection is opened, although we remark
that the freshness of a connection is guaranteed by in-
corporating a timestamp into the connection initiation
message.
Because the establishment of a connection is a
somewhat frequent occurrence, it is important that a
connection key be distributed efficiently. The method
for distributing a connection key should, if possible,
require a single multicast and a single encryption (ver-
sus one encryption for each site on the originator's
member list). In Isis, we achieve this by employing
a group communication key (or just communication
key). A communication key is a shared key possessed
by all sites in the group. The communication key for
a group is created by the site hosting the first member
of the group, and as other processes join, it is given
to their sites as described below. The connection key
for a connection is thus communicated in a single mul-
ticast, encrypted with the communication key of the
group.
In an open network environment, key exchange
eventually requires the intervention of some a prior/
trusted authority, which often takes the form of an
authentication service. In Isis we employ such a ser-
vice to establish secure channels by which communica-
tion keys can be distributed. We choose a public key
authentication service due to the security advantages
that can be achieved [9]. Associated with the authen-
tication service is a private key (known only to the
service) and a corresponding public key. The public
key is given to each site, along with the site's own site
key (a private key/public key pair), when it is booted. 3
3The boot procedure appropriate for each site in a paxticu-
Once booted, the site obtains from the authentication
service its certificate, which contains the identifier and
public key of the site and the expiration time of the
certificate, all signed by the private key of the authen-
tication service. Each site's certificate is subsequently
disseminated from the site itself, with the site con-
tacting the authentication service for a new certificate
when its certificate expires. The exact implementa-
tion of the authentication service is a topic of ongoing
research; one possible approach is described in [20].
A communication key is sent to a site after obtain-
ing the site's certificate and encrypting the communi-
cation key under the site's public key. This exchange
takes place as part of the group join protocol, which
will be described in the next section. We emphasize
that no interaction with the authentication service is
required when a communication key is distributed.
To summarize, we propose to protect group com-
munication via a hierarchical key distribution scheme.
The initial keys in the system are the site keys. A
group communication key is created when the group
is created and distributed using site keys when group
joins take place. This communication key, in turn, is
used to establish connection keys within the group.
The benefits of this scheme are many. First, the use
of shared keys and efficient algorithms at the level of
connections should result in minimal performance cost
for group multicasts, which are by far the most com-
mon operations in most Isis applications today. Sec-
ond, since a different key is used per connection, the
lifetime of a connection key is limited, and a different
key is used for each muiticasting source. This should
limit an intruder's ability to cryptanalytically attack
connection keys. Third, the more costly public key
operations are performed less frequently, when groups
are joined.
Finally, we emphasize that sites hold connection
keys, communication keys, and private keys of sites:
user processes do not. This prevents a malicious user
process on an uncorrupt site from improperly dis-
tributing or using these keys. Moreover, when a pro-
cess is removed from a group, the site on which it re-
sides can destroy the communication and connection
keys that it held on behalf of the process. By doing so.
if the site is subsequently corrupted, then the intruder
will not be able to masquerade as a group member. If
lax setting is dependent on many factors, such as the physical
security of the site, whether the site is disldess, and the role of
the site in the system. Thus, a complete discussion of this issue
is outside the scope of this paper. However, the boot proce-
dure used st each site should prevent an intruder from booting
the site with false operating system or Isis code or with a false
authentication service public key.
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the entire site crashes, we rely upon the loss of volatile
storage to eliminate all keys from memory.
4.2 Joining groups
The protocol by which a process joins a group is
crucial to the process group abstraction, because if
this is not secure, an intruder may cause the process
to observe fallacious group views and thus to act in-
correctly. In Isis, the protocol for a process to join a
group is as follows. First, the requesting process spec-
ifies the group address of the group it wishes to join.
This address contains the address of a group contact,
which is a distinguished site in the group. The pro-
cess' site sends the join request to the group contact
and, once admitted, is sent a list of group members
by some site in the group. Note that if the requesting
site includes its certificate in the request, then the site
that returns the member list can also return the group
communication key encrypted under the site's public
key.
In order for the join protocol to be secure, the pro-
cess' site must be able to authenticate the response as
being from a site in the group. And, since the pro-
cess' site does not know what sites are in the group,
the site keys of section 4.1 do not suffice for this. To
facilitate the required authentication, we introduce a
new type of key. When a group is first created, the ini-
tial site in the group creates a public key/private key
pair, the private key of which is called the group key
(or just the private key of the group). The group key
is then communicated to group members' sites just as
the communication key is, as part of the join protocol.
While these operations will reduce the performance of
group creates and joins, they have no effect on the
performance of group communication. Like communi-
cation keys, the group key is destroyed by a site when
all group members it hosts are removed from the group
(or when the site itself fails). We utilize this new type
of key by including the public key of the group in the
group address. This enables a joining process' site to
verify a site's membership in the group by challenging
it to prove posse_ion of the group key.
Of course, the succe_ of this scheme hinges on the
ability of a process to obtain the authentic address of
a group it wishes to join; for the remainder of this sec-
tion we address this issue. Other than by creating the
group, in Isis a process can obtain a group address in
either of two ways: it can simply receive it from an-
other application process, or if the group is registered
at the Isis name service, then the process can request
the group address from the name service by specifying
the group name. The name service is a fault tolerant
Isis service that implements a hierarchical name space,
like that of a file system except with group addresses
(or other information) at the leaves instead of files. A
group name is a path from the root to a leaf in that
hierarchical name space. A process can register the
group address under some name at the name service
anytime after the group is created. A group that has
not been registered with the name service is an anony-
mous group, and the address of an anonymous group
can be obtained only from another application process
(or by creating the group).
If a process receives an address from another appli-
cation process, it can trust that address only as much
as it trusts the other process. In particular, if it can
be verified that the sending process is a member of
either a "trustworthy" process group or a group that
was delegated by such a group (see section 5), then the
address may be perfectly acceptable. But, to verify
the claims of the sending process, the receiving pro-
cess must obtain the group addresses (i.e., the pub-
lic keys) of the delegating groups and the group of
which the sending process claims to be a member. So,
in many cases verification of group addresses received
from other processes requires that the verifying pro-
cess be able to obtain authentic group addresses from
the name service.
Thus, the ability to obtain authentic group ad-
dresses through the name service is fundamental to
the security of group joins. The authentication mech-
anisms of section 4.1 can easily be adapted to allow a
site to authenticate the name service, e.g., by having
the name service sign group addresses with its pri-
vate key and having the authentication servic_ prr-
duce a certificate for the name service. However, as
it stands there is still no reason for the process to be-
lieve an address obtained from the name service, be-
cause the name service cannot verify the integrity' of
the addresses itreceivesand stores.To compensate
forthisproblem, we allow processesto impose access
controlsupon the directoriesof the hierarchicalnam,"
space. That is,when a processcreatesa directoryof
the name space, itspecifiesaccesscontrolpolicy'5_r
the directorythat restrictswhich processescan r._-
istera group or createa directoryin that director_
in section5,we describe a method by which thisa,` -
cess controlpolicycan be representedand enforc,,i
The name servicewillallow only an authorized pr,_-
cess(residingon an authorizedsite,which can be ._,J-
thenticatedasinsection4.1)to registera group inlh,
directory.A processcan then obtain a group ad,Jr....
from a directoryit"trusts"based upon the direct,-,r_-
owner and accesscontrolpolicy.
4.3 Causal multicast
As previously described, the CBCAST protocol im-
plements Isis' causal delivery ordering property and is
central to the Isis system. For pedagogical reasons,
we begin this section with two illustrations of causal
multicast ordering.
Consider first an instance of single group causality,
illustrated in part (a) of figure 1. This shows a single
process group with four members pl, p2, pz and P4,
residing respectively on sites st, s2, s3 and s4. Time
increases down the vertical lines, and a group of arrows
emanating from a point on a vertical line represents
a CBCAST (i.e., causal multicast) to the group. An
arrow ending at the vertical line below a process indi-
cates the delivery of the multicast represented by the
arrow to the process. (We have omitted drawing the
delivery of the message to the sending process, which
can be done immediately.) In this example, Pl multi-
casts rut to the group, and after s_ delivers it to P2, P2
multicasts m2 to the group. Causality requires that
m_ be delivered to p4 after ml, as indicated in part (a)
of figure 1. The method by which s4 decides upon this
delivery ordering depends on the particular CBCAST
protocol used.
The more complex flavor of causality is called mul-
tiple group causality, illustrated in part (b) of figure 1.
In this example the four processes are organized into
three processgroups Gl, G2 and Ga, respectivelyin
views {pt,P2,p4}, {p2,Ps} and {P3,p4}. FirstPt mul-
ticasts message mt to group Gl. After ml is delivered
to P2, P_ multicasts m2 to G_, and upon delivery of
rn2 to Ps, Ps multicasts ms to Gs. Multiple group
causality requires that m3 be delivered to p4 after mr,
as indicated in the figure.
The CBCAST protocol is implemented above the
MUTS layer. Thus, given the authentication mecha-
nisms of section 4.1, the CBCAST protocol can rely
upon the MUTS abstractions (i.e., at-most-once, se-
quenced multicast) in an uncorrupt group. As we will
see in a moment, this enables us to use certain Isis
protocols originally designed for benign environments
to provide causal orderings among messages in a set
of uncorrupt groups.
However, we argue that for applications that must
interact with untrusted principals (e.g., the trading
service of section 1), this guarantee may not suffice.
To see why, suppose that s3 is corrupt in part (b)
of figure 1. Depending on the particular CBCAST
protocol used, it may be possible for s3, by not fol-
lowing the protocol, to trick s4 into delivering m3 to
P4 before mr, as in part (c) of figure 1. Intuitively,
s3 might do this by omitting to include information
on rn3 that conveys ms's causal relationship with rnt.
Such an attack is possible with several of the causal
multicast protocols described in [3]. The danger in this
is apparent in the OTC example of section 1: suppose
that Gt is the replicated trading service, rnl contains
a client's request to purchase stock, and rn2 reflects
that (intended) purchase. Then, after seeing m_., the
intruder at s3 could attempt to effect the delivery of a
request m3 for the same stock before mx at replica p4
of the service, in order to raise the apparent demand
for that stock and thus the price offered to the correct
client. Therefore, if a causal delivery ordering between
rnt and ms is not enforced, a type of "insider trading"
may occur.
This problem illustrates a form of attack that must
be considered in any system that attempts to detect
causal orderings among messages. We call this type of
attack a backdating attack. Informally, a message rn is
said to be backdated if there exists another message m'
such that m is causally after (i.e., could have been af-
fected by) m', but at some correct site, it appears that
m is not causally after m 1. So, in the example above,
the message ma is backdated, because the causality
detection mechanisms at s4 could not detect that rn3
should not be delivered until mt was. Naturally, there
is a complementary form of attack called postdating,
although in general it poses no threat to applications
concerned with potential causality only. A more for-
mal discussion of postdating and backdating attacks
with respect to various forms of causality is outside the
scope of this paper and will be presented elsewhere.
Message encryption is, in general, a prerequisite to
preventing backdating attacks, because the intruder
can eavesdrop on all messages and can initiate acti;-
ity from a corrupt site or malicious process based upon
the information so observed. To illustrate this. sup-
pose that in the previous trading service example, the
intruder observes mt on the network and sends m3
based only upon information obtained from rnt (i.e,
remove m2 from the figure). Now we have precisely
the same scenario as before, in the sense that rn3 must
be delivered to P4 after mt in order to prevent the "in-
sider trading" previously described. However, there is
no apparent way for s4 to detect this causal relatic, n-
ship. This problem can be prevented by encr)ptlt_g
mr, which prevents an intruder from viewing rnt '+ cc, t_-
tents. Whether encryption is justified in a specifi : c,x,,,
depends upon the particular application and me,sag,,
although for simplicity we assume in the rem+tit_,l, r
of this section that all communication is encrypt e,t _
described in section 4.1.
The set of causal guarantees we provide pr+ _,t_r-
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backdating attacks, in addition to providing the nor-
mal causal guarantees in uncorrupt groups. To specify
these guarantees, we first introduce some terminology.
We say that a message is recezved at a site when MUTS
at that site gives the message to the CBCAST layer,
and we further stipulate that a message is received at
the site from which it is multicast immediately after
it is multicast. It is also convenient to redefine
to avoid making any assumptions regarding events at
corrupt sites or the semantics of multicasts in corrupt
groups. Henceforth, -,-* is the smallest relation satis-
fying the following conditions.
• For any i and p, ife_ and e_+1 are executed on an
i
uncorrupt site, then ep -,-* e;+t.
• For any p, q, rn and G, if G is uncorrupt and
if meastp(m,G) and deliverq(rn, G) are exe-
cuted on uncorrupt sites, then meastp(rn, G) ",-*
deliverq (m, G).
As before, ---* is defined as the transitive closure of
-,,*. Suppo6e that meastp(rn, G) --* meastq(m',G'),
where G is uncorrupt. Note that by the definition
of --,, p and q reside on uncorrupt sites (when these
events are executed), although G' may be corrupt. Let
r be any process to which rn is delivered in G. Then,
we provide the following guarantee.
• If G' is uncorrupt and m' is delivered to r in G',
then m' is delivered to r after m.
• If G and G' are different groups and a message
rh is (i) received at r's site after the multicast of
m' from q's site but (ii) delivered to r before m,
then _ was multicast before m' was multicast.
The first guarantee is simply the usual causal
guarantee of section 2 applied to communica-
tion among uncorrupt groups: deliver,(m,G) --
deliverr(m',G'). The second guarantee is intended
to prevent baekdating attacks. To see this, suppose
that G _ is corrupt. Clearly any message rh seat on
the basis of information the intruder obtains from m'
can be received at r's site only after m _ is multicast.
And, if the attempt to backdate rh to before m were
successful, then _ would be delivered before m. How-
ever, this guarantee says that if both of these condi-
tions hold, then the intruder must have sent rh before
seeing m'. For instance, in the OTC example of figure
1, this prevents rn3 (= rh) from being delivered before
mt (= m) at s4 (= r's site), because m3 is received at
s4 after the multicast of rn2 (= rn').
We provide these guarantees through a combina-
tion of several protocols described in [3]. Here we de-
scribe protocols that suffice when group memberships
do not change; in the remainder of this section we trPat
each (uncorrupt) group as simply a static set of pro-
cesses. (Although we synchronize communication on
view changes precisely as in [3], this introduces com-
plexities that are best omitted for the sake of brevity )
The protocols described here also require that commu-
nication with corrupt sites be performed in a point-to-
point fashion, as suggested at the beginning of sect iota
4. We have extended these protocols to provide rh+.
above guarantees even without this requirement: ,:,m_
++3i"+ L'+''"":+-,+,u:,.',_!+:At._TY
such protocol is described in appendix A.
We begin with the vector timestamp protocol for
a single group, which provides single group causality
only. More precisely, suppose we define _"G for an un-
corrupt group G to be the smallest relation satisfying
the following conditions.
i
• For any p E G and any i, ep "-_u e_+t.
• For any m and any p,q E G,
mcastp(m, G) "-_G deliverq(m, G).
As usual, let --,_ denote the transitive closure of
"_G. The vector timestamp protocol guarantees
that if meastp(m,G) "*G mcastq(m',G), then
deliverr(m, G) ---*c deliverr(m', G) at any common
destination r.
In this protocol, a vector timestamp VTG(m) is ap-
pended to each multicast m in group G by the site
multicasting m. Vector timestamps are assigned to
messages in such a way that VTG(m) -K VTG(m') iff
mcastp(m, G) "--*a mcas%(m', G), where -_ is an ir-
reflexive partial order on the timestamps. When a
message is received in a group G at a site, it is placed
in the delivery sequence for a destination immediately
before the earliest message m' already in that de-
livery sequence such that m' was received in G and
VTa(m) ._ VTa(m'); if no such m' exists, then m is
placed at the end of the delivery sequence. So, mes-
sages are delivered in order of receipt, except when
that would result in a violation of single group causal-
ity. If G is a static group of size two created for point-
to-point communication, then messages in G can be
delivered in the order they are received, and vector
timestamps are not used in G; i.e., a message received
in G is simply placed at the end of the delivery se-
quence for the destination.
We extend this protocol to provide the above multi-
ple group guarantees by using the conservative proto-
col. In this protocol, a multica_t is defined to be stable
if it has been received at all of its destination sites. A
group G is active for a process p if p's site does not
know of the stability of a multicast to G either sent
by or delivered to p. The conservative muiticast rule
states that a proce_ p may multicast to group G if
and only if G is the only active group for p or p has
no active groups. If p attempts to multicast when this
condition is not satisfied, the multicast is delayed, and
during this delay no multicasts are delivered to p. So,
in part (b) of figure 1, s_ simply delays sending m2 un-
til it knows that ml has been received by s4, and then
s4 delivers rnl before ms, because they were received
in that order.
The proof that these protocols satisfy the first guar-
antee is given in [3]. We now argue that these proto-
cols provide the second guarantee. Suppose that G
and G' are different groups, and that _ is receive4 at
r's site s, after m' was multicast, but delivered to r
before m. By the conservative protocol, m was sta-
ble and thus received at s_ before m' was multicast.
Therefore, rh must have been received at s, after rn.
By the above protocol descriptions, rh could have been
delivered before m only if (i) rh were multicast in G
and VTa(rh) -< VTG(m), or (ii) rfi were mutticast in
another group G, and for some rn previously received
in G and placed before m in the delivery sequence,
VT¢(_) -K VT¢(rh). Now, suppose for a contradic-
tion that rh was actually sent after (or at the same
time that) m' was multicast. Possibility (i) could not
happen due to the correctness of the vector timestamp
protocol for group G, and similarly (ii) could not hap-
pen if G were uncorrupt. So, G must be corrupt. But,
assuming that (_ is really a point-to-point connection,
vector timestamps in (_ are not used, and (ii) could
not happen. Thus, r_ must have been sent before m'.
5 Delegation and access control
As stated before, the work of section 4 presupposes
uncorrupt groups (except where otherwise stated). In
light of this, it is obvious that in real systems, access
to groups must be restricted. In the "secure island
of sites" model discussed in section 1, access control is
obviously needed to prevent a process on an untrusted
site from joining a group. Access control is also needed
within the secured island, because while the sites in
that island are assumed to be secure, the processes
they execute should not necessarily be trusted to join
any group whatsoever.
In this section we propose an access control scheme
based upon access control lists (ACLs) that we plan
to employ in our system. We have chosen ACLs over
classic capabilities to avoid several well-known short-
comings of capabilities, such as difficulties involved in
revoking access rights, the inability to specify denial of
access rights, and the need to confine capability prop-
agation. And, while in some settings these problems
are offset by the relative efficiency of capabilities, w,.
have found that in majority of Isis applications, grout,
joins are infrequent in comparison to other group ,q)-
erations (e.g., multicasts). Thus, we expect tha_ _h,"
economy of capabilities would impact overall s3_t,._
performance only minimally. The scheme we pr, I;....
here is sufficiently powerful to be used as th, .,,1,
means to control access to groups, although it , ,,_1_t
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also easily be adapted for use in a hybrid scheme (e.g.,
[121).
The straightforwardcriteriaon which torestrictac-
cess to groups are the owner and siteof the process
requestingaccess.That is,when a group iscreated,
the creatingprocess would specifya set (i.e.,ACL)
of (owner,site}pairsthat indicatesthe processesthat
would be allowed tojoin the group. While thismay
sufficefor many applications,there may be some for
which thisisinsufficient.Consider an extensionofthe
OTC example ofsection1 inwhich a clientgroup au-
thorizesthe tradingserviceto purchase certainstocks
with funds inthe client'sbank account. Suppose that
the servicemust then send a representativeprocessto
a group establishedby the client'sbank toarrange the
fund transferfor the stock purchase.4 But, the bank
willadmit thisprocessto the group only ifthe process
has been duly authorizedby one of the bank's clients.
In this case,determining whether to admit the pro-
cess based upon its owner (e.g., an individual broker)
and hosting site is insufficient for two reasons: this in-
formation neither convinces the bank group that the
process represents the trading service nor conveys the
authorization to access the client's account.
This flavor of authorization is related to many con-
cepts that have appeared in the literature in recent
years, including aathentication forwarding [26], cas-
caded authentication [25], and delegation [11]. Infor-
mally, each of these terms connotes the means by
which one party confers access rights to another, as
exemplified by the client delegating authority to the
trading service in the previous example. Delegation
in a group oriented system is different from that in
other systems only in that groups are delegating and
being delegated. In practical terms, this means that
groups need to be authenticated. Fortunately, we al-
ready have the mechanisms to do this, namely group
keys and the name service introduced in section 4.2.
The approach we take to delegation is best illus-
trated by an example. Suppose that group G1 wishes
to delegate some authority to group G2. To do so,
some member of G1 causes the credential
a,,T_,G2,S,(GI,7"1,G2) (I)
to be produced, where "Tl" isthe time at which this
credentialexpires,"$I" denotesthe signaturefunction
of GI (i.e.,signaturewith the privatekey ofGl), and
4In practice, the representative would probably request to
become an his clien_ of the bank group. Isis would then invis-
ibly create another group containing the client and the group
members. The access control scheme presented in this section
is particularly weLl-suited to restricting client access, although
for simplicity we will explain it in terms of member access only.
"GI" and "G2" identify groups G1 and G:, respec-
tively, either by address or name. Intuitively, a mem-
ber of G2 can present (1) to another party to prove
that G1 has delegated some access rights to G_ until
time T1; in general, the access granted to members of
G2 based on (1) is left to the discretion of individ-
ual object monitors. Any party can verify (1) with
the address of G1, which contains Gl's public key (see
section 4.2). A process in G2 can delegate further to
group G3 by forming
G1, T1, G2, T2, G3, &(SdG_, T_, GD, T_,G3). (2)
(In the notation of (2),we are assuming that the sig-
nature scheme allows any party possessingthe pub-
lickey of G_ to invertS2(SI(GI,TI,G2),T2, G3) to
obtain ,91(GI,Tl,G_),T_,G3.) This credentialshould
be consideredvaliduntiltime rain{T1,T2}. Of course,
G3 could delegateyet furtherina similarfashion,and
in general,credentialscould become arbitrarilylong.
This delegationscheme issimilarto that in [25],and
the reader isreferredtherefor a generaldiscussionof
itsfeatures.
The choiceof whether to delegateto a group name
or a group addresshas subtleimplications.Ifa delega-
tionismade toa group address(e.g.,if"G_" isa group
addressin(I)),then only the group thatpossessesthe
privatekey corresponding to the public key in that
group addresscan utilizethat delegation.However, if
a delegationismade to a group name, then any group
that isregisteredunder that name beforethe delega-
tion expirescan possiblyexploitit. We expect that
both types ofdelegationwillbe usefultoapplications.
For instance,inthe previousOTC example, the client
might delegatetothe name ofthe tradingservice,ifit
wants the "current"trading service,whatever group
that may be, to perform the transactionfor it. The
tradingservice,however, may delegateto the address
of a satellitegroup that will handle the transaction
with the bank. By delegatingto a group name, the
delegatorimplicitlytruststhe directoriesthat are pre-
fixesofthe name to allowonly "trusted"groups to be
registeredunder the name to which itdelegated au-
thority.Below we willdescribea scheme that can be
used to controlaccessto directories.
The method by which a delegatinggroup identi-
tiesitself is also important. This is true because the
delegating group can restrict what access rights are
transferred to the delegated group by identifying it-
self appropriately. This is known as delegating by"
roles and has been used in other delegation schemes
(e.g., [11, 17]). Intuitively, associated with each role
ll
ofagroupissomesubsetoftheaccessrightsthat the
groupisallowedto delegatetoothers.Whenagroup
delegatestheauthorityof a role,theauthoritytrans-
ferredto thedelegatedgroupis at mostthat of the
role,andnotofthedelegatingroup.So,in theOTC
example,theclientgroupcoulddelegate authority to
the trading service under a role that was used to estab-
lish the bank account and that would be useless, e.g.,
for reading the client's mail. As another example, cre-
dential (1) could represent a referral made by a bank
group G1 for a client G2, which is required before the
bank's loan service will negotiate with the client. In
this case, G1 would probably delegate by a role with
which no access rights of G_, per se, are associated,
but that nevertheless indicates the needed referral. In
our setting, a role corresponds to just another group
name or group address. That is, a group can create
roles for itself by registering other names for the group
with the name service or by "duplicating" the group
to obtain several group addresses (i.e., public keys).
This delegation scheme extends easily to an ac-
cess control scheme for group membership as follows.
Replicated at each site in a group is a set of delegation
templates in addition to the set of (owner, site) pairs
previously described. Each delegation template is a
list {_1,..-,{_, where each _i is either a group name
or address. (This does not imply that a group must
know in advance the addres_s or names of all groups
that should appear in its delegation templates. The
method of specifying these templates could employ,
e.g., wild cards.) A credential
G1,TI,...,G,,_-I,T,n-I,G,n,$,,,-I(...) (3)
is said to match the delegation template {_1,...,_,_
if m >_ n and for all j satisfying 1 < j <_ n,
Grn-,_+j = _j. (Here, two addresse_ are equal if they
contain the same public key.) That is, the credential
in (3) matches the template _1,..., _,_ if the creden-
tial ends with a sequence of delegations beginning with
_1, followed by {_2, and so on, and ending with _,_. In-
tuitively, the credentials that match some delegation
template of a group are those that the group accepts
as legitimate patterns of delegation.
Given sets of delegation templates and (owner, site}
pairs, access to a group is controlled as follows. If the
group contact receives credential (3) embedded in a
request from some process p to join the group, p is
allowed to join if and only if all of the following hold.
# The authenticity of credential (3) can be verified
with the appropriate group addresses (i.e., public
keys).
• p's site can vouch that p is in Gm (by illustrating
knowledge of the private key for Gin).
• Message (3) matches a delegation template for the
group.
* None of the delegations in message (3) have ex-
pired.
. The (owner, site) pair of p is listed in the set of
(owner, site) pairs for the group.
The group contact obtains any group addresses it
needs to check these conditions from the name service
(or from the credential itself).
We are currently considering extensions to this
scheme to enable the group being joined to automat-
ically limit the duration for which an admitted pro-
cess is allowed to remain a member. These limitations
could be based upon the credential used by the process
to gain admittance and could vary depending on the
meaning assigned to the credential by the application.
For instance, depending on the meaning of (3), in the
above scenario p could be allowed to remain a member
(i) indefinitely, (ii) until time min{Tt,...,Tm_t} is
reached, (iii) until p is removed from G,n, or (iv) until
either (ii) or (iii) occurs. In cases (ii), (iii), or (iv), p's
site could remove p from the group when the appropri-
ate condition occurs. Which of (i)-(iv) is chosen for a
particular joining process could be determined on tile
basis of which delegation template and (owner, site)
pair were matched to be admitted. Other extensions
to this access control scheme are being considered but
will not be discussed here.
This access control mechanism can be extended to
objects other than groups. We have already seen one
need for this, namely the directories of the hierarchi-
cal name space implemented by the name service de-
scribed in section 4.2. As in many file systems, a nam_ _
service directory has three natural types of access to
it, namely search, read and write. So, as when cre-
ating a group, a process can specify when creating a
directory in the name service a set of delegation tem-
plates and a set of (owner, site} pairs for each of th,_, •
types of access. A request to perform an operat_,_t_
on a directory would then be allowed subject to th, _
above five conditions on the requesting process a_,l
the credential it supplies.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have described a security arc!_il,
ture for use in the Isis toolkit, but structured ir_ ._: _
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a way that moet mechanisms should also be useful
in other group orientedsettings.The major features
of the securityarchitectureincludea group oriented
authenticationsubsystem, securemethods forjoining
groups, and protocolsthat provide certaincausalde-
liveryordering guarantees. In addition,we have pro-
posed an accesscontrolscheme based upon delegation
foruse ingroup orientedsettings.
Implementation ofthe basicmechanisms has begun
at CornellUniversity,inconjunctionwith the reimple-
mentation ofIsis.This implementation should provide
valuableinsightinto the efficiencyof our architecture
and mechanisms, and itisalsoforcingus to consider
user interfaceissues.In addition,we are in the pro-
cessofdevelopingthe necessaryinformationexchange
protocols.
Future work on this system isheading in several
directions.We axe consideringseveraldifferentexten-
sionsto the design of the system. In particular,we
arecurrentlyconsideringways to employ the basicar-
chitecturedescribedhere atmultiplesecuritylevels,as
would be appropriateifislandsofsiteswere securedat
differentlevels.However, we arestillunclearas tothe
consequencesofsuch a design.We are alsoconsidering
techniquesto recover,e.g.,afteran intruderhas infil-
trateda group. Finally,we are exploringtechniques
for building secure,faulttolerantapplications,given
the secured abstractionsprovided by thisarchitecture.
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A Causal multicast, continued
In this appendix, we describe a modification to the
CBCAST protocol described in section 4.3 that pro-
vides the causal guarantees described there without
requiring that communication with corrupt sites b,
only point-to-point. By removing this requirement, w_,
provide somewhat stronger causal guarantees to. e.g.
a process that finds itself in the intersection of ur_cor-
rupt and corrupt (non-point-to-point) groups, ttow-
ever, this protocol does not directly provide any ¢,th,_r
guarantees in a corrupt group, and so processes that
require other guarantees should continue to com1_mn_-
cate with potentially corrupt sites in a point-to-i)o_t
fashion only. We assume that group membershq, s (,_f
uncorrupt groups) are static, as before, and we tr.)at .t
group as simply a set of processes. Again, the exl,_
sions to handle group view changes are precisely r h ....
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in [3], although we omit them for the sake of brevity.
The relations ---* and ---*G are defined as in section 4.3.
The essential modification to the protocol of section
4.3 occurs in the placement of received messages in a
destination's delivery sequence. When a message m is
received at a site, it is simply placed at the end of the
delivery sequence. Then, beginning with the earliest
undelivered message in the sequence, the sequence is
stepped through, and the following rule is applied in
turn to each message m' (until m is reached): if m _
was received in the same group G as m and VTG(m) -..(
VTc(m_), then m _ is moved to the back of the delivery
sequence. The placement of m and this processing of
the sequence are done atomically, in the sense that no
new messages are delivered or added to the delivery
sequence until both are complete. We claim that with
no further modifications, this new protocol provides
the two guarantees of section 4.3.
We begin by sketching the proof of the second guar-
antee. Suppose that G and G _ are different groups,
and that rh is received at r's site s, after m J was mul-
ticast. By the conservative protocol of [3], m was sta-
ble before m' was multicast, as was any rh such that
mcast_(rh, G) --'*G mcastp(m,G). Therefore, once
m _ was multicast, m was already received at s, and
could never again be moved back in the delivery se-
quence for r. Since fn is received after m _ is multicast,
it follows that rh must be delivered to r after m. So,
the antecedent of the second guarantee cannot hap-
pen, and the condition is satisfied trivially.
We now sketch the proof for the first guarantee. If
G and G _are different groups, then the second guaran-
tee with rh -- m _ implies the first. If G and G _ are the
same group and mcast_(m,G) ""G mcastq(m _, G),
then the first guarantee holds by the normal vector
timestamp protocol and the new placement rule, be-
cause once m' is placed behind m in the delivery se-
quence for r, it will again be moved behind m each
time m is moved to the end of the sequence. The
last case is if G and G _ are the same group and
mcastp(m, G) "_G mcastq( m_, G). In this case, there
must be some _, fn and G different from G such that
mcastp(m, G) --* mcast_(rh, (_) --* mcastq(m', G).
As in the argument above for the second guarantee.
once rh is multicast, m is received at s, and can never
again be moved back in the delivery sequence for r.
And, since m _ can be received at s, only after rh is
multicast, m is delivered to r before ra_.
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